We have 8 full presentations of 15 minutes each with 5 minutes for discussion and speaker switching. Prof. Alkan will give an invited talk following the morning coffee break.
| Time | Presentation |
|---|---|
| 08:30 - 08:40 | Welcome and Introduction |
| 08:40 - 09:00 | D. Briskorn, G. Erdelyi and C. Reger. Bribery Under Partial Information. |
| 09:00 - 09:20 | Y. Yang and J. Guo. How Hard is Control in Multi-Peaked Elections: a Parameterized Study. |
| 09:20 - 09:40 | M. Polukarov, S. Obraztsova, Z. Rabinovich, A. Kruglyi, and N. Jennings. Convergence to Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy. |
| 09:40 - 09:50 | Short Break / Discussion |
| 09:50 - 10:10 | S. Obraztsova, O. Lev, E. Markakis, Z. Rabinovich, and J. S. Rosenschein. Truth-Bias Complexity in the Veto Voting Rule. |
| 10:10 - 10:30 | J. Zou, R. Meir, and D. Parkes. Strategic Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls. |
| 10:30 - 11:00 | Coffee Break |
| 11:00 - 12:00 | Invited Talk: Ahmet Alkan, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Science at Sabanci University. Title: Pairing Games and Markets - A. Alkan and A. Tuncay Abstract: Pairing Games or Markets studied here are non-bipartite NTU assignment games or, equivalently put, roommate games with payments and a flexible utility transfer. Allowing for half-partnerships to form as well as full-partnerships, we call an allocation semistable (resp., stable) if it consists of half-partnerships and full-partnerships (resp., full-partnerships only) and there is no blocking pair. We call the set of all stable or semistable allocations the Equilibrium Set. We show that the Equilibrium Set is always nonempty. We actually spell out an iterative algorithm – a Market Procedure – that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We also show that the Equilibrium Set consists either of stable allocations or of semistable allocations and that it has has several notable properties such as virtual convexity and the median property. We additionally offer an analysis based on prudent blocking, introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are a subset of the Demand Bargaining Set. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here. |
| 12:00 - 12:20 | M. Aleksandrov, S. Gaspers, and T. Walsh. Empirical Analysis of a Food Bank Problem. |
| 12:20 - 12:40 | J. A. Doucette, H. Hosseini, A. Tsang, R. Cohen, and K. Larson. Voting with Social Networks: Truth Springs from Argument Amongst Friends. |
| 12:40 - 13:00 | M. Brill, R. Freeman, and V. Conitzer. Computing the Optimal Game. |
| 13:00 - 13:10 | Closing / Wrap-Up |